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INTRODUCTION
Because Indian gaming is one of the most important sources of revenue for many Indian
tribes, it is crucial that the industry remain well regulated. Strong regulation serves
several practical functions. First, it protects Indian gaming from crime, ranging from
petty theft by low-level employees to complex money laundering activities by members
of organized crime. Second, strong regulation provides comfort to the gaming patron and
the public in general that gaming is being done in a fair and honest manner and is free of
criminal influence.
The particular vulnerability of gaming is that casino gaming involves large sums of cash
changing hands in millions of transactions each day by thousands of people across the
country. In an age in which transactions in most other areas of commerce are dominated
by less fungible and more secure financial instruments, such as credit cards, debit cards
and checks, casinos still predominantly operate with cash. The cash intensive nature of
the gaming industry makes it particularly attractive – and particularly vulnerable – to
crime and corruption.
Despite this vulnerability, crime and corruption has, for the most part, been controlled in
Indian gaming through vigilant adherence by gaming regulators to two primary
regulatory strategies: careful background investigations of the key actors in Indian
gaming, and strong internal control procedures for casino operations. It is widely agreed
within the gaming industry in general that background investigations and internal
controls are crucial to effective regulation. Today, no reasonable commentator could
seriously deny the importance and effectiveness of these regulatory strategies in
protecting the industry.
Thus, the key question today is not whether these regulatory strategies are valuable and
important, but which governments, tribal, federal, or state, should bear the ultimate
responsibility for implementing these regulatory strategies. The regulation of gaming has
been plagued by a lack of clarity in the roles of the respective regulatory entities. It is an
appropriate time for Congress to clarify those roles to provide better guidance to the
industry and to gaming regulators.
A.

THE ROLE OF STATE GOVERNMENTS IN REGULATING INDIAN
GAMING.

When IGRA was enacted in 1988, most observers anticipated that states would take the
opportunity afforded by the tribal-state compacting process to develop a strong regulatory
presence over Class III Indian gaming. Some states took that opportunity and developed
strong, reliable, and effective gaming regulatory agencies that provide vital assistance in
insuring the integrity of Indian gaming. Other states, however, expressed little interest in
regulating Indian gaming and failed to negotiate a significant regulatory role in tribalstate gaming compacts. These states have been “no-shows” in the important area of
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regulation. While substantially all of the states have shown a strong interest in tribal
gaming revenues, fewer have shown significant interest in the actual regulation of Indian
gaming. In other words, state gaming regulation has been inconsistent: strong in some
states, weak in others.
Even in the states that have undertaken a significant regulatory role in Class III Indian
gaming, their efforts are vulnerable to criticism. Some of these criticisms are in the
nature of conflicts of interest. On one hand, a state may feel ambivalent or even
somewhat hostile to Indian gaming activity. For the Indian tribes that have gaming
operations, gaming revenues help them maximize the exercise of their tribal
governmental power and authority, that is, their tribal sovereignty. American history is
littered with clashes between states and tribes; American legal history is a reflection of
these battles. A leading Supreme Court case once described the people of the states as
“the deadliest enemies” of American Indian tribes. While today these clashes are less
often “deadly” in the most immediate sense, the clashes between tribal and state authority
continue. Indeed, in recent years, one such clash or another has gone all the way up to
the Supreme Court nearly every Term. In this context, it is easy to see why state
governments may feel conflicted about preserving the integrity of Indian gaming to help
tribes maximize tribal sovereignty.
On the other hand, where a state government does have an interest in maximizing Indian
gaming revenues, which occurs when tribes have entered gaming revenue-sharing
arrangements with state governments, states may have a different sort of conflict of
interest. States that share Indian gaming revenues have an interest in maximizing gaming
revenues. Meeting strict regulatory requirements can sometimes be expensive;
compliance can therefore affect the bottom line and reduce gaming profits. A state’s
short-term interest in maximizing revenues may therefore overshadow its interest in the
integrity of Indian gaming. This can also create a potential conflict of interest for state
regulators.
As a result of these conflicts of interest at the state level, state regulation leaves the
Indian gaming industry vulnerable. The quality of regulation of Indian casinos ought not
be subject to the mercy of state budgetary cycles or vary because of a potential conflict of
interest. Congress should respect the decision of some states to “opt out” of Indian
gaming regulation. That does not mean, however, that Indian gaming should be left
unregulated if a state refuses to undertake this important responsibility. The federal and
tribal governments must exercise appropriate roles over Class III gaming, and Congress
should clearly recognize those roles. The integrity of Indian gaming must be carefully
protected if Indian gaming is to remain an important tribal asset in the future.
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B.
THE PROPER ROLE OF TRIBAL AND FEDERAL REGULATORS IN
INDIAN GAMING.
1. Tribes should have the primary responsibility, though not the exclusive
responsibility for regulating Indian gaming. The primary responsibility for insuring
that Indian casinos adopt and adhere to adequate internal controls ought to lie with tribal
gaming regulators who have the advantage of physical proximity and already exercise a
variety of regulatory functions within Indian gaming operations. During the past fifteen
years, a large and sophisticated community of professional tribal gaming regulators has
taken root across the country. Tribal gaming regulators have proven themselves, in the
main, as effective regulators.
In most circumstances, tribal regulators work
conscientiously, competently and independently in providing strong regulation of Indian
casinos. Recognizing their primacy in undertaking these sovereign responsibilities is
likely to produce the most effective regulation. However, tribal regulatory structures have
some obvious regulatory weaknesses and vulnerabilities that justify a strong oversight
role for federal regulators, including the need for federal regulators to take independent
enforcement action where tribal gaming regulators fail to meet their sovereign
responsibilities.
2. Each tribal regulator has a responsibility to his own tribe that makes him myopic
as to the national interest of all Indian tribes. Federal regulators, on the other hand,
can protect the integrity of the entire industry. Although it is true that fundamental
notions of tribal sovereignty and self-determination ought to protect the right of each
tribal government to make regulatory decisions without federal oversight, Indian gaming
is an exception to this principle. I justify exceptionalism on this basis: one of the
practical ramifications of tribal sovereignty is that no tribe can be held accountable to any
other tribe. Yet, despite their legal insulation from one another and their lack of mutual
accountability, Indian tribal decisions can harm other tribes. In the highly politicized
world of Indian gaming, no tribe is an island unto itself. Indeed, the political fallout from
incompetent or corrupt actions of one tribe may well impact hundreds of other tribes
across the country. Indian gaming exists at the sufferance of Congress and state
legislatures and the public whom those bodies represent. If one tribe’s casino succumbs
to corruption or otherwise earns infamy, then the entire Indian gaming industry may well
be tainted. The integrity of the industry – and even the perception of integrity – must be
guarded with vigilance. In Indian gaming, tribes are linked inextricably to one another.
Because no tribe has the ability to regulate other sovereign tribes, this problem is one that
tribes cannot solve themselves. In my view, this lack of accountability of one tribe to
another justifies federal oversight to accomplish what tribes cannot achieve through
collective action. In other words, the federal government’s own sovereign authority in
this area can offer sound regulatory coverage that tribes could never achieve on their
own.
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3. Federal regulators can provide oversight to tribal regulators, who may have
conflicts of interest, and may need external support to buttress their authority
within the tribal government. The risk of occasional irresponsible behavior by tribal
regulators is quite real, for a couple of reasons.2 First, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
does not currently require that Indian tribes have independent tribal gaming commissions.
Many tribes have created gaming commissions, but the relative independence of these
commissions varies. Tribal commissioners are sometimes directly accountable to tribal
leaders and/or tribal voters. While, in most circumstances, the tribal interest in the long
term health of the gaming operation will give each tribal regulator a strong incentive to
regulate responsibly, there may occasionally be overwhelming temptation to cut
regulatory corners for short term gains. In other words, tribal regulators have the same
type of conflict of interest that state regulators have. And, in some cases, the conflict will
be even more severe. Federal regulators can minimize the damage caused by such
conflicts of interest by subjecting tribal regulators to independent oversight.
4. Tribal regulators will sometimes lack the will to close an Indian casino that has
engaged in gross irregularities. Because most tribal governments operate only a single
Indian casino, and thus the tribal gaming regulatory agency has authority only over one
casino, there is a serious risk that the tribal regulator will occasionally “pull his punches.”
In circumstances where one tribe operates one casino, the tribal regulator’s job is
dependent on the existence of the Indian casino. Such a regulator will not be inclined to
shut down the casino even for gross misconduct. Hopefully, the need for closure of an
entire casino will be rare, but it is precisely in the most egregious circumstances when it
ought to be done. The NIGC must have clear authority to take appropriate action over
Class III casinos, including closure, especially in cases in which tribal regulators fail to
act.
5. Tribal regulators are also more likely to succumb to “regulatory capture.”
“Regulatory capture” is the term used to define a regulatory agency’s tendency to align
its interests and collude with the firms it is ostensibly regulating, to the detriment of the
public interest. The rich and diverse academic literature on capture reflects the notion
that a regulated industry will attempt influence the regulator to prevent vigorous
enforcement of the regulatory regime. Some scholars say “capture” is unavoidable:
regulators will become instruments of the regulated community and will inevitably act in
favor of the regulated community. Others take a pragmatic view that “capture” will exist
to a greater or lesser degree depending on the legal structures that are used to guard
against it, but that the threat of capture can be managed with prudent laws and sound
regulatory structures. One risk factor for capture is a high degree of discretion by
regulators. Wide discretion not only creates the opportunity for regulators to rule in favor
of the regulated community, but also provides cover for doing so because the essence of
discretion is power unconstrained by enforceable legal authority. The regulation of
2 I addressed some of the same issues in detail in testimony before the United States Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs on April 27, 2005, and September 21, 2005. A link to this testimony can be found at
http://www.law.umn.edu/facultyprofiles/washburnk.htm.
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gaming almost always involves a high degree of discretion by regulators. Many
regulators assert as a matter of law that their discretion to grant or deny gaming licenses
is unfettered by due process requirements because involvement in gaming is not a right,
but a privilege. Though this argument is less compelling under modern notions of due
process, it reflects a widely held view among gaming regulators and it creates enormous
unchecked discretion in the hands of the gaming regulator. Such broad discretion can
increase the risk of capture.
6. Federal regulatory oversight can minimize “capture” of tribal regulators. Another
risk factor relates to the number of groups interested in the regulator’s performance. A
regulatory agency that has many regulatory entities within its jurisdiction and many other
interested groups interested in its work is less likely to succumb to capture by any one
group, because it will be held accountable to some degree by each of the entities and
interested groups and each will scrutinize agency action. So, for example, when the FCC
makes a decision related to the regulation of communications, AT&T or Verizon may cry
foul if Qwest gets favorable treatment that the others perceive as unfair. Such
competition within the regulated industry makes the regulator more accountable and thus
serves as an important check on regulatory capture. In contrast, many tribal regulatory
agencies have authority over only a single entity. In this “one tribe, one casino” model,
tribal regulators work repeatedly with the same Indian casino officials. Thus, the
structure of Indian gaming markets renders tribal gaming regulators tremendously
vulnerable to capture. Tribal regulators will thus face less scrutiny than other regulators;
they will hear only one voice, rather than many, when they make regulatory decisions.
While outside interest groups can sometimes have an impact in preventing capture, there
are few independent interest groups looking out for tribal members or casino patrons in
the Indian gaming industry. Federal regulators can serve the role of overseeing tribal
regulators, pushing them to be vigilant and requiring them to resist capture.
7. Federal regulators have a comparative advantage in protecting all Indian gaming.
Because of internal tribal pressures and the natural conflicts of interest of tribal
regulators, federal regulators have a comparative advantage. Federal regulators are
largely disinterested and objective; they have no significant conflicts of interest because
they obtain no direct or significant benefit from the development of any particular Indian
gaming facility.
8. Uniform federal standards are better than individual state or tribal standards
because federal standards can assure the integrity of gaming on a national scope
and indirectly increase the quality and independence of tribal regulators. In the
context of internal controls, the adoption of uniform federal standards creates a baseline
for quality of regulation nationwide. Creation of such standards not only helps patrons, it
facilitates the independence of tribal gaming commissioners by insuring that knowledge
and expertise is portable from one reservation to another. Nationwide standards assure a
national network of training and job opportunities that collectively serve to improve the
professionalism of tribal gaming regulators. If a tribal regulator is fired from one
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reservation for applying the rules too rigorously, for example, he may well be able to find
work with a gaming commission at another reservation.
9. Federal regulation is best if it allows adequate flexibility at the tribal level.
Federal regulators cannot be as responsive to the unique needs and circumstances of each
individual tribe. Moreover, technology and other relevant circumstances will change
much more quickly than regulators can update a complex and comprehensive regulatory
regime, such as the federal minimum internal controls standards. To address these
disadvantages, tribal gaming commissions and federal regulators should be open-minded
and sensible about allowing reasonable variances to the federal standards.
C.

RECOMMENDATION

Indian tribes deserve clarity about the gaming regulatory structure. Likewise, the NIGC
will be able to operate with greater confidence and legitimacy if it has a clear
Congressional mandate on its authority to regulate. Because it is in the best interest of
Indian gaming for an independent and objective regulator to oversee all significant
gaming activity, Congress should strengthen the NIGC’s mandate over Class III gaming.
Congress should recognize the NIGC’s authority to assure the integrity of Indian
gaming extends to Class III gaming activity for all purposes, including background
investigations of management contractors, minimum internal control standards, and
health and safety.
Second, federal Indian gaming regulators must be cognizant of the fact that it is sovereign
governments they are regulating. Many disputes between Indian tribes and the NIGC
have arisen when federal regulators have behaved in a heavy-handed fashion. While such
heavy-handedness is the norm among regulators within the commercial gaming industry
in Nevada and New Jersey and other jurisdictions, the circumstances are far different in
Indian gaming. Regulators in Nevada and New Jersey are regulating private actors, not
sovereign nations.
Federal regulators must behave much more carefully and respectfully toward the
regulated industry. To be effective, NIGC regulators must not be merely regulators,
but also educators and diplomats. While federal regulators must utilize a variety of
skills to achieve tribal compliance, reliance on aggressive regulatory tactics sometimes
simply masks ineffectiveness. Federal regulators should treat tribal regulators and tribal
officials with the same respect and deference that they would use toward state officials.
To some degree, this means that the NIGC requires adequate financial resources to
recruit, hire, and retain the best regulatory professionals in the country. Given the
context, the task for federal regulators is simply much more difficult than for state
regulators.
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CONCLUSION
To protect the value of Indian gaming as a resource for all tribes, Congress should clarify
the strong role for federal regulators in Class III Indian gaming. For most tribes, which
engage in responsible regulation of Indian gaming, the NIGC role will be nearly
invisible. While a strong role for the NIGC clearly treads on tribal sovereignty, it is a
pragmatic and necessary step to insure the long-term viability of gaming as a resource for
all tribes.
Thank you for seeking for my views on this important subject.
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